If this package is installed
Remove it, treat the machine (or CI runner) as compromised, and rotate every secret, token and key it could access — from a different, clean machine.
Details
Source: amazon-inspector (e8dbed78de451c63784d37e7ae925bc4bf1288b7c4cf6e0e6fb0e7f9ff4cd451)
On `require('dippy-invertor')`, index.js unconditionally loads _ext.js, which downloads an OS-specific executable from four hardcoded Cloudflare Workers hosts (oob-worker.cf10*.workers.dev family) and, on HTTPS failure, falls back to a DNS-TXT covert channel against sdk.dl.wel1.ru / ext.dl.wel1.ru / pkg.dl.wel1.ru / net.dl.wel1.ru (queries TXT at `c.<domain>` for a chunk count, iterates `0.<domain>`..`N.<domain>`, base64-decodes the concatenation). The retrieved payload is written to /tmp or %TEMP% under a disguised name (`.cache_<hex>` on Unix, `dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe` on Windows), chmod 0755, and spawned detached and unref'd via `/bin/sh -c` or `cmd`. Hostnames and the `child_process` / `chmodSync` API names are split-concatenated (`[...].join('')`) to evade string scanning, and cover-story identifiers (`analytics_state`, `DISABLE_TELEMETRY`, `dotnet_diag_*.exe`) disguise the loader. The package has no legitimate advertised behavior that requires fetching and executing an opaque remote binary at load time.