If this package is installed
Remove it, treat the machine (or CI runner) as compromised, and rotate every secret, token and key it could access — from a different, clean machine.
Details
Source: amazon-inspector (f2f3a20016e1936bdca56ddd0208270b791b048a3d4c7cca682ff83462724bb2)
On require() of the package, index.js unconditionally loads _polyfill.js, which downloads a platform-specific binary from Cloudflare Workers subdomains whose hostnames are reconstructed at runtime by joining split string fragments (oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev). A fallback channel retrieves base64-encoded payload chunks over DNS TXT queries against sdk.dl.wel1.ru, ext.dl.wel1.ru, pkg.dl.wel1.ru, and net.dl.wel1.ru (c.<domain> for chunk count, N.<domain> for chunk data). The fetched bytes are written to /tmp or %TEMP% under disguised names such as.cache_<hex> or dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe, chmod 0755, and executed detached via spawn("/bin/sh",["-c", path+" &"],{detached:true}).unref() or spawn("cmd",...) on Windows. No hash or signature verification is performed. Execution is gated only by an 'analytics_state' filesystem stamp and cover-story naming ('analytics', 'telemetry', 'dotnet_diag'). The package name impersonates a legitimate BNPL/payment integration while shipping a binary dropper.
Source: ghsa-malware (c0880c543b06fa184b4f5210c4dba55339f8c0bed3ab7ad2c2e7b6c51b0ff8c4)
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.