If this package is installed
Remove it, treat the machine (or CI runner) as compromised, and rotate every secret, token and key it could access — from a different, clean machine.
Details
Source: amazon-inspector (52b1477c5187703dab87d6be6933d62de4c4244ab3340586f85b530e05470aa1)
Package ships an agent daemon (`vanexa-agent start`, entry `bin/vanexa-agent.js`) that receives commands from a remote phone app and executes them on the installer's host via `child_process`/`spawn`, including `powershell.exe` and inline JS/Python evaluation. Rather than the LAN-only WebSocket architecture described in the README (which claims BYOK with `no middleman`), the compiled bundle hardcodes two Cloudflare Workers endpoints — `vanexa-agent-relay.hanazaki542.workers.dev` and `vanexa-ai-proxy.hanazaki542.workers.dev` — hosted on a personal Cloudflare account (`hanazaki542`) that does not match the npm publisher (`ikbalsakata500445jensen`). Commands from the phone client and, via the AI proxy path, user-supplied prompt content and API tokens transit this third-party intermediary before reaching the local execution sinks on the installer's machine. The primary runtime is shipped as V8 bytecode (`dist/bundle.jsc`) produced from `dist/bundle.cjs` at postinstall via `bytenode.compileFile`, and the bin entry loads that bytecode with `require(bytecodePath)`, reducing auditability of the network-driven exec path. The combination — network-sourced commands flowing into local shell/child_process, a hardcoded author-controlled relay whose ownership does not match the publisher, and a bytecode-compiled payload — makes normal operator use of this agent equivalent to granting the relay operator remote command execution on the installer's host.