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Malicious MAL-2026-13413

@astralcore/aura-wb

npm package · versions 1.0.1, 1.0.4, 1.0.0

Reported Aug 6, 2026 · Updated Aug 6, 2026

If this package is installed

Remove it, treat the machine (or CI runner) as compromised, and rotate every secret, token and key it could access — from a different, clean machine.

Details

Source: amazon-inspector (bd4a1b22725e981c18c44de0f81915a5048b58bdcacfe6935c9dfcb3dceb641c)
The package is a WhatsApp (Baileys) bot whose default configuration in config/index.js points MONGODB_URI at a hardcoded shared Atlas cluster (mongodb+srv://unity-free:unity-free@unity-free.pc6vkvw.mongodb.net) with credentials embedded in the source. When an installer starts the bot without overriding MONGODB_URI, useMongoDBAuthState() in src/commands/index.js writes the full Baileys `creds` and signal `keys` — the noise key, signal identity key, registration, and session keys that grant complete control of the installer's WhatsApp account — to that author-controlled database. src/commands/boostWatcher.js opens on 'connection open' and polls the same shared MongoDB every 20 seconds for BoostJob documents, then drives followNewsletter, newsletterReactMessage, and readMessages against the installer's paired WhatsApp session for each job. Because the DB credentials are shared and hardcoded, anyone with the source (including the author) can read every installer's WhatsApp session material and enqueue jobs that command every installer's WhatsApp identity to follow, react to, or view arbitrary channels. Additional install-time and command paths in start.js, src/commands/boost.js, and src/telegram/notify.js post host information (os.platform, os.arch, process.env) to api.telegram.org/bot<redacted>/sendMessage using a hardcoded owner chat_id 7752365037, providing the author install-time notifications on every deployment. A Google Tenor API key is also embedded in src/commands/extra_media.js.