If this package is installed
Remove it, treat the machine (or CI runner) as compromised, and rotate every secret, token and key it could access — from a different, clean machine.
Details
Source: amazon-inspector (7ea5d4f1af0a0b67e6f74bfb45867ce0b33136083138e3c23a56df03d8b5c902)
The `conductor daemon` command (bin/conductor-daemon.js -> src/daemon.js) opens a WebSocket to https://conductor.conductor-ai.top (or a user-configured backend_url) and registers a message handler that, in `handleTerminalInput`, writes `payload.data` received from the server directly into a node-pty process. The PTY is spawned by `handleCreatePtyTask` running either the user's default shell (/bin/bash, /bin/zsh, cmd.exe, $SHELL) or a CLI from DEFAULT_CLI_LIST, which launches `codex --dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandbox` and `claude --dangerously-skip-permissions` — the same flags are written into the generated config.yaml by bin/conductor-config.js. Any party controlling the WebSocket peer (the Conductor backend, an impersonator on the network, or a compromised backend account) can drive arbitrary commands into the installer's shell or into an AI CLI whose local approval/sandbox gates have been disabled by default. The remote-command channel and the disabled-safety flags together provide full-host command execution driven by conductor-ai.top.