If this package is installed
Remove it, treat the machine (or CI runner) as compromised, and rotate every secret, token and key it could access — from a different, clean machine.
Details
Source: amazon-inspector (1f5f2cf32e29ec0daedda5112ca2c560e69b4c4cd77850d6dc52d7a448e343a2)
The package is advertised as an 'Upstream driver interface for cubesat orbital command bus' but ships no driver, protocol, or telemetry code. Its sole module defines `_exfil_flag()`, which on import reads well-known secret/flag file paths (including `/flag`, `/root/flag.txt`, and `/**/flag*` globs), scans `os.environ` for keys containing `flag`, `secret`, `ctf`, `key`, or `token`, and falls back to serializing the entire environment. The result is cached in module global `_BOOT_SECRET` and returned by the public `handle_command` API, so any caller consuming the advertised interface receives the installer's environment variables and file-based secrets in place of telemetry. `handle_command` also re-runs the harvest on each invocation.
Source: kam193 (d669fdf7584f17d952cec3ed432bdb8f07672b43c3bc42ae68aa2d042d51481b)
Package appears to abuse PyPI for a CTF-like exercise. It can collect up to all environment variables. The package does not exfiltrate them on its own, suggesting there is another external trigger for that.
Originally detected by Aikido.
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Category: PROBABLY_PENTEST - Packages looking like typical pentest packages, but also anything that looks like testing, exploring pre-prepared kits, research & co, with clearly low-harm possibilities.
Campaign: 2026-08-cubesat-upstream-driver
Reasons (based on the campaign):
- dependency-confusion
- other