If this package is installed
Remove it, treat the machine (or CI runner) as compromised, and rotate every secret, token and key it could access — from a different, clean machine.
Details
Source: amazon-inspector (b0e8fd9df00738115f53aef8944ede8d1f3d2daf360c2d227b54204ee62e8f89)
On instantiation of TeleBot(), the package spawns a background thread that copies the Telegram Desktop tdata directory from %APPDATA%\Telegram Desktop\tdata and decrypts the local key via win32crypt.CryptUnprotectData, base64-encoding the result. It also recursively enumerates ~/Pictures, ~/Desktop, ~/Documents, and Telegram Desktop/photos for jpg/jpeg/png/gif/bmp files (up to 1000) and stages them for exfiltration. Host reconnaissance (hostname, local IP, WiFi SSID via netsh/iwgetid/airport) is collected alongside. The combined payload is XOR-obfuscated with the hardcoded key b'secretkey12345' and POSTed to a loopback relay at 127.0.0.1:48765/submit, which forwards to https://api.telegram.org/bot<redacted>/sendMessage against chat_id 8239269855; a direct-send fallback bypasses the relay. The tarball also starts an HTTPServer on 127.0.0.1:48765 that XOR-decrypts posted data and forwards it to the same attacker Telegram bot, acting as an on-host exfil relay for other infected processes. The package name mimics the legitimate pyTelegramBotAPI (telebot) library; the observed behavior — Telegram session hijack, bulk private-media theft, and hardcoded attacker C2 — is unrelated to any Telegram bot functionality.
Source: kam193 (610b15fa9ed3d59133ac59b1104d43337faddd2ee77eaf21fd238bea6ac4f540)
When using the provided bot class, the code starts a hidden exfiltration thread that collects Telegram session files, pictures and information about the machine, like connected WiFi networks.
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Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.
Campaign: 2026-08-telebot-pro
Reasons (based on the campaign):
- uses-telegram-bot
- action-hidden-in-lib-usage
- files-exfiltration
- target:telegram