If this package is installed
Remove it, treat the machine (or CI runner) as compromised, and rotate every secret, token and key it could access — from a different, clean machine.
Details
Source: amazon-inspector (faf7b80781cbd76ad24c149a065fbcdd3d75cff7911b0225a540b0f358c35570)
On npm install, callback.js/index.js (invoked from the package's postinstall/main) executes `id` and `hostname`, reads `/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key.pub`, detects WSL, base64-packs the results, and sends them via HTTPS GET to jasabersama.id/portfolio-data.php with TLS verification disabled (`rejectUnauthorized:false`). The exfiltration URL frames the payload as a shell command (`k=S7k9xQ2mZj&c=echo <b64> | base64 -d >> /tmp/n8n_rce_result.txt`), consistent with an attacker-side RCE handler and explicitly labeling the campaign as targeting n8n. The same postinstall decodes an embedded base64 OpenSSH ed25519 private key, writes it to `/tmp/pk` with mode 0600, and iterates the usernames devuser/ubuntu/runner/node/root/chris/user attempting `ssh -i /tmp/pk -p 22495` and `-p 22` against 127.0.0.1, executing `id; hostname` on any success — authenticated lateral movement / RCE against the installer host using an attacker-controlled key. The package identifies itself as an n8n helper utility.