If this package is installed
Remove it, treat the machine (or CI runner) as compromised, and rotate every secret, token and key it could access — from a different, clean machine.
Details
Source: amazon-inspector (5a36d35f64443b9dc4a2395017b8738562a321c9765089f916eeebdf58281d57)
The default export getPlugin issues an HTTPS request to the hardcoded bare-IP endpoint https://31.97.137.157:45000/icons/107 and passes the returned data.credits field to new Function(...) with require, process, Buffer, and other Node globals injected, then invokes it. Any consumer that imports and calls the default export executes attacker-controlled JavaScript with full Node privileges. Package identity is inconsistent: README describes a live-log utility, package.json.description advertises a 'TypeScript SDK for the Polymarket CLOB API', and keywords are ['react','helper','svg']. A dead setDefaultModule function constructs plausible cdnjs URLs but is never called, while the reachable code path targets the bare IP. Declared dependencies (@primno/dpapi, better-sqlite3, node-machine-id) are consistent with browser-credential-stealer post-exploitation tooling the fetched payload could invoke.