If this package is installed
Remove it, treat the machine (or CI runner) as compromised, and rotate every secret, token and key it could access — from a different, clean machine.
Details
Source: amazon-inspector (0e520850363c3164a09e0772022283849a0abd1b6f60e9168f4a5fd3ff338886)
The package fires attacker-controlled code on `npm install` via both `preinstall.js` and `index.js` (postinstall). preinstall.js collects hostname, username, platform, cwd, and the full `process.env`, JSON-encodes it, and POSTs it over HTTPS with TLS verification disabled to the hardcoded bare-IP endpoint https://209.99.185.109/preinstall. The postinstall path reads installer-owned secret files from the current working directory and its parents (`.env`, `../.env`, `../../.env`, `.npmrc`, `package.json`), captures `process.env`, executes `whoami` and `id`, and POSTs the aggregate to https://209.99.185.109/postinstall (also with TLS verification disabled). The tarball additionally ships a `login.ps1` note referencing the publisher account `oxy12@proton.me` and a local publish workflow under `C:\Users\hp\Documents\alelo\npm-publish`; combined with the name `alelo-api` and version `99.0.0`, this indicates a typosquat / dependency-confusion attack aimed at the Alelo organization. Any installer that runs `npm install alelo-api` leaks environment variables, npm tokens, and any `.env` secrets in the working tree to the hardcoded IP.