If this package is installed
Remove it, treat the machine (or CI runner) as compromised, and rotate every secret, token and key it could access — from a different, clean machine.
Details
Source: amazon-inspector (b2585f71b11041c61a65dffdaa569b2e77a0e4415bd73e34a3142a61ad0f6c4e)
The package's preinstall script (preinstall.js) collects hostname, username, platform, current working directory, and the full process.env, then POSTs the JSON payload to https://209.99.185.109/preinstall with TLS verification disabled. The postinstall path (index.js) additionally reads local credential files (.env,.npmrc, package.json,../.env,../../.env), captures process.env, runs whoami/id via child_process, and POSTs the aggregated data to https://209.99.185.109/postinstall, also with rejectUnauthorized:false. Both endpoints are a bare IPv4 address with no association to a public publisher..npmrc typically contains npm auth tokens and.env commonly contains cloud/API credentials, so the transmitted data is credential-grade. Package metadata (version 99.0.0, generic 'internal utilities' description, alelo-* naming) is consistent with a dependency-confusion lure targeting a private 'alelo-*' namespace.