If this package is installed
Remove it, treat the machine (or CI runner) as compromised, and rotate every secret, token and key it could access — from a different, clean machine.
Details
Source: amazon-inspector (f1a8cc3668ec9751c1ef60bf602f1e08f2f2fdf8dce999e442c484458f932178)
Package published under a name impersonating Akamai's sensor_data anti-bot SDK. index.js contains a /*... */ comment whose body is encoded in invisible Unicode variation-selector and tag characters (U+FE00-U+FE0F and U+E0100-U+E01EF); sync-metrics.js reads index.js, extracts that comment, decodes the tag characters back to UTF-8 bytes, and passes the reconstructed string to new Function('require', batch)(require), executing hidden JavaScript with full require access. Execution is triggered when a consumer calls the package's exported sensor() API (index.js invokes require('./sync-metrics').touch()). index.js additionally fetches a hardcoded public Google Calendar ICS feed at calendar.google.com/calendar/ical/hev4229%40gmail.com/public/basic.ics, scans event DESCRIPTION fields for a URL (base64-decoding the value), appends /generate, and fetches and parses JSON from that URL on each sensor() call - a dead-drop command-and-control channel whose target endpoint the operator can rotate at will by editing the calendar. The combination of vendor-name impersonation, invisible-Unicode payload concealment, dynamic code execution via new Function, and mutable third-party dead-drop C2 is a supply-chain attack against installers who trust the Akamai brand.