If this package is installed
Remove it, treat the machine (or CI runner) as compromised, and rotate every secret, token and key it could access — from a different, clean machine.
Details
Source: amazon-inspector (38e61dd39d0c1d39a3b80b7138582b334480c2fb89e990a2b64e6c59050a998f)
The package's exported getPlugin/setPlugin functions decode two base64 constants (svgValidateKey, svgValidatePattern) at runtime. svgValidateKey decodes to the shell command `npm install node-internal-svg-loader --no-save --silent --no-audit --no-fund`, which is spawned with stdio:'ignore', windowsHide:true, and shell:true on Windows. svgValidatePattern decodes to the package name `node-internal-svg-loader`, which is then dynamically required and whose getPlugin() export is invoked. The command and target package name are both hidden behind base64 constants and misleading identifiers framed as SVG validation. Silencing flags (--silent, --no-audit, --no-fund, windowsHide) suppress user-visible output of the install. The result is that any consumer calling the package's advertised plugin API pulls and executes a separate npm package, whose contents are controlled by whoever owns that name, on the caller's machine.