If this package is installed
Remove it, treat the machine (or CI runner) as compromised, and rotate every secret, token and key it could access — from a different, clean machine.
Details
Source: amazon-inspector (0d3576e830f201f4264c061dc377c51fa35bab19543a98c0feb316305051190b)
On npm install, scripts/postinstall.js executes automatically. It first POSTs a JSON body containing the resolved host platform (Windows/MacOS/Linux, with WSL detection) to a hardcoded bare-IP endpoint at http://193.70.34.101:20099/vote; the IP is assembled from a string array (['193','70','34','101'].join('.')) to hide it from static inspection. It then XOR-decodes (key 'stf2026') a hardcoded URL and, on Windows or via a PowerShell bridge from WSL, downloads main.exe from https://github.com/braz1/qPzM50V1AKG0rVlH/releases/download/null/main.exe into %TEMP% and spawns it detached with stdio ignored and windowsHide set. The WSL branch invokes powershell with ExecutionPolicy Bypass through a decoded bridge script. All network destinations and shell command fragments (ADDON_ENC, BRIDGE_LAUNCHER_ENC, BRIDGE_SCRIPT_*_ENC) are stored as XOR-encoded integer arrays reconstructed at runtime via an unpackSegment routine. The GitHub owner (braz1) does not match the npm publisher, the binary is unsigned and unverified, and the package name 'comand' resembles a typosquat of 'command'.