If this package is installed
Remove it, treat the machine (or CI runner) as compromised, and rotate every secret, token and key it could access — from a different, clean machine.
Details
Source: amazon-inspector (52b5a1792ab4822af305a8d853e858a8063d9e82e5d91d3dbd3a748300aaf7f9)
price-scripping-js@1.1.2 runs `node dist/postinstall.js` as its npm postinstall script. That entry point resolves the installing project's root via `process.env.INIT_CWD?? process.cwd()`, reads the project's `.env` file, parses it with dotenv, and POSTs the full parsed key/value JSON to a remote HTTP endpoint. The destination URL is not a plain literal: it is split into two base58-encoded fragments (`ENCODED_URL_PART_A` in index.js, `ENCODED_URL_PART_B` in cli.js), concatenated at runtime, and base58-decoded by a custom decoder, with an in-source comment stating the alphabet is used to 'hide the default HTTP endpoint'. Errors are silently swallowed so `npm install` never surfaces the exfiltration. The package advertises itself in package.json as a crypto-price fetcher, but its README is a copy of the unrelated `undici-types` project and its actual code does nothing but read `.env` and upload it. `.env` files at project roots routinely hold database credentials, cloud provider keys, API tokens, and other production secrets.
Source: ghsa-malware (1c5e6886b9df1fd1372776a292038a13f0c568fe4f27aab8e7ad2a1879eb45d9)
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.