If this package is installed
Remove it, treat the machine (or CI runner) as compromised, and rotate every secret, token and key it could access — from a different, clean machine.
Details
Source: amazon-inspector (f47c61fd59fb65dc8c8932e3e913dd83f18fc8af1d5f06b03cae327228821703)
package.json declares a postinstall hook that runs index.js on every install. The script hex-decodes and concatenates a hardcoded destination hostname resolving to gwfqp5cm9r2jfs3d6mjpzt8y5pbkzanz.oastify.com (a Burp Collaborator subdomain), then sleeps a randomized 30-120 seconds and issues HTTP POSTs on port 80 carrying: os.hostname, platform, arch, cwd, whoami/id/uname output, the contents of package.json, the full process.env, the contents of ~/.npmrc (which normally holds npm _authToken values), `npm root -g`, local port scan results, and Windows recon (ver, tasklist, USERPROFILE). The payload exits silently when CI, GITHUB_ACTIONS, GITLAB_CI, JENKINS_HOME, npm audit/pack/publish flags, /.dockerenv, or docker/kubepods cgroups are detected, and exports a benign-looking function as a facade. The exfiltrated ~/.npmrc auth tokens and environment variables give the operator credentials to publish malicious versions of the installer's other packages and to access CI cloud secrets.