If this package is installed
Remove it, treat the machine (or CI runner) as compromised, and rotate every secret, token and key it could access — from a different, clean machine.
Details
Source: amazon-inspector (1acf694ae0258defc54c414980c5f8512b7055e69630ede15a8bfb37d2005b9b)
On any require()/import of mcq-session, the main module runs a top-level async IIFE that reads a file at../../../../public/logo.ico (a path escaping the package root into a host application's public assets), DES-decrypts the bytes with a hardcoded password 'bf497c0b9cee' using multiple CryptoJS decode formats, and pipes the decrypted plaintext into a detached, unref'd 'node' subprocess via stdin. The decrypted content is treated as executable JavaScript with no signature check, integrity verification, or user gate. The loader is disguised behind cover-story identifiers ('readLogoIco', 'ThetaSDK initialization'). The symmetric key ships alongside the loader, so the encryption serves only to defeat static inspection of the staged payload. The out-of-package path indicates the payload is dropped separately alongside a host application, making the on-disk blob attacker-controlled from the installer's perspective.