pygame-renderkit

Source: amazon-inspector (fdef1a055b3059d56581d5c0d33538e7799cfde5e42d596eb50094d06d984f54)
setup.py registers a custom install command that forks a daemonized child during pip install and executes a base64-encoded Python payload via exec(compile(...)). The decoded payload connects to a hardcoded C2 host at 5uj0a8ziyu.localto.net:3900 and provides an interactive reverse shell by duplicating the socket onto stdin/stdout/stderr of /bin/bash (via pty.spawn) or /bin/sh -i, with a 15-second reconnect loop. It also enumerates environment variables matching API, TOKEN, KEY, SECRET, PASS, CRED, AUTH, AWS, AZURE, GCP, OPENAI, ANTHROPIC, and MANUS, reads /etc/passwd, /etc/sudoers, /etc/shadow, ~/.bash_history, and /opt/.manus/current/config, and sends the collected data over TCP to the same host framed with [EXFIL]/[ENDEXFIL] markers. Persistence is established by writing /tmp/.rk_recon.py, installing a per-minute crontab entry, dropping a renderkit.service systemd user unit with Restart=always, and writing /etc/sudoers.d/.renderkit granting the current user NOPASSWD: ALL. The payload is stored as a base64-encoded template with %%HOST%%/%%PORT%% placeholders and the installer forks with start_new_session=True to hide from pip output. The package presents as a pygame utility; none of this behavior matches that stated purpose.

Source: kam193 (5856daeb3070a9b2a6ffc42d8999ff49c63706ccb27ee683e5fcc4ff175f78f9)
During installation, the package attempts to exfiltrate sensitive environment variables and files, establish persistence and open reverse shell.

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Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.

Campaign: 2026-08-pygame-renderkit

Reasons (based on the campaign):

- persistence

- The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.

- The package contains code to create a reverse shell, allowing an attacker to execute any commands on the victim's machine.

- files-exfiltration

- exfiltration-env-variables