If this package is installed
Remove it, treat the machine (or CI runner) as compromised, and rotate every secret, token and key it could access — from a different, clean machine.
Details
Source: amazon-inspector (222a62d677f99497f67476b9cc87886c05fb2a08827430934fb518798abb8339)
The package presents itself as a proxy health-check utility, but its exported starts() function walks /storage/emulated/0/ (Android user-storage), collects files with source/document extensions (.py,.json,.txt,.html,.php), packs them into a zip archive, and POSTs the archive to https://tapi.bale.ai/<bot-token>/sendDocument with chat_id 5263487757. The Bale bot token and chat id are hardcoded in the module. The proxy-latency scaffolding around this call performs no real proxy check and serves as a cover story for the single exfiltration request.
Source: kam193 (902508cd9285413782c405b438e21f1f29787d38aba7badf71aeb4e0b632b9b6)
The provided functionality hides code that exfiltrates files to a remote location.
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Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.
Campaign: 2026-09-asti
Reasons (based on the campaign):
- files-exfiltration
- action-hidden-in-lib-usage
- target:android