If this package is installed
Remove it, treat the machine (or CI runner) as compromised, and rotate every secret, token and key it could access — from a different, clean machine.
Details
Source: amazon-inspector (0b6dec4d715e2863e7f55749d6d2a390926f3f2f1df62e4de223c6acc818632d)
The package runs a bootstrap from both its install lifecycle script (`node index.js`) and its main module that invokes an obfuscated probe. The probe reads `os.userInfo().username`, `os.hostname()`, and the basename of `process.cwd()`, concatenates them with a static tag (`bxcfg`) and a timestamp, and performs a `dns.resolve4` lookup against `<tag>.<user>.<host>.<cwd>.<ts>.oob.algamil7x.xyz`, exfiltrating installer identity over DNS to a non-first-party domain unrelated to the claimed baanx publisher. The exfil host and the `os`/`dns`/`userInfo`/`hostname`/`cwd`/`resolve4` API references are hidden in `String.fromCharCode`/hex-decoded byte arrays in `probe/impl.js` and sibling files `e9c3a6.js` / `f0d4b7.js`, and the `os` and `dns` modules are loaded through `module.constructor._load` with decoded name arrays to defeat static analysis. Behavior fires automatically on `npm install` and on `require('@baanx/blockchain-config')`.
Source: ghsa-malware (6efa71410686d3ace79a501e2afa27505312aab915fb79429b312f9456d272b0)
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.