If this package is installed
Remove it, treat the machine (or CI runner) as compromised, and rotate every secret, token and key it could access — from a different, clean machine.
Details
Source: amazon-inspector (2f3ed1442f0588fda7bc378a0fe79c7170864472c6cca93b8ec6629645b1add0)
The npm package mxdriver@0.0.2 ships obfuscator.io-style string-array-obfuscated preinstall and postinstall scripts (scripts/preinstall.js, scripts/postinstall.js). On npm install, the decoded scripts fetch remote content from api.imghippo.com (an anonymous third-party image host, e.g. https://api.imghippo.com/files/hOG8244hc.png) and a second URL under www.image.com/, write the bytes into the package directory as gldriver_pre_asset.exe and gldriver_pre_core.exe, then invoke a platform-specific opener against the.exe path via child_process.exec (`mspaint "..."` on win32, `open "..."` on darwin, `xdg-open "..."` on linux), and delete the files. The README frames the package as a Google APIs wrapper, which does not correspond to downloading and opening.exe files at install time. The delivery source is mutable and non-publisher, no hash or signature is verified, the destination filename is an executable extension, and the URLs, filenames, and shell commands are all hidden behind a rotated string-array accessor (`_0x5c7e`) — a classic install-time dropper pattern whose payload can be swapped at any time by whoever controls the imghippo asset.