If this package is installed
Remove it, treat the machine (or CI runner) as compromised, and rotate every secret, token and key it could access — from a different, clean machine.
Details
Source: amazon-inspector (455f1d04545c9ed17722705fe61415d7e536e2800c2a3c588ab69985004c73b9)
The tarball ships three undeclared prebuilt executables under bin/ (bin/cli, bin/cli-linux-amd64, and an 81 MB Bun-compiled bin/cli-http-linux) that are not exposed via package.json.bin. The manifest's only bin entry hatcher-env points to bin/cli.js, which is absent from the tarball, and the declared main src/index.js is an unrelated dotenv-style parser hardcoded to /home/hatch/test.dat with no reference to the shipped binaries. The bundled JS region of bin/cli-http-linux embeds the anonymous Cloudflare Tunnel host already-query-bacteria-agreed.trycloudflare.com adjacent to HTTP POST verbs, and the README instructs the installer to execute one of the./bin/ binaries at least once to 'activate the package in our systems.' Running the binary opens a channel from the installer's host to an attacker-controlled trycloudflare.com tunnel; the readable JS surface is a decoy for opaque native payloads whose actual behavior is not documented.