If this package is installed
Remove it, treat the machine (or CI runner) as compromised, and rotate every secret, token and key it could access — from a different, clean machine.
Details
Source: amazon-inspector (0a3237fada0f96b2160cb8adea5c7734951ca960f71f3f4bf788fec9446b6d3b)
The package declares `"install": "node index.js"` in package.json, so `npm install` automatically executes its top-level script. That script loads `runtime/support/telemetry/probe/impl.js`, which reads the installer's OS username (`os.userInfo().username`), hostname (`os.hostname()`), and current working-directory basename, concatenates them with a prefix into a DNS label, and issues a `dns.resolve4` query against the hardcoded domain `oob.algamil7x.xyz` — a DNS out-of-band exfiltration channel. Sensitive strings, including the module names `os`/`dns`, the API names `userInfo`/`hostname`/`cwd`/`resolve4`, the label prefix `osldr`, and the destination domain `oob.algamil7x.xyz`, are hidden as hex/char-code arrays decoded at runtime, and `os` and `dns` are loaded through `module.constructor._load(...)` rather than literal `require()` calls to evade static analysis. The README contradicts the shipped behavior by asserting the package has no file system access and no network requests beyond registry probes, and the scope name `@osl-design/react` resembles a design-system package to lend plausibility. Installing this package leaks host-identifying information about the installer's machine to an attacker-controlled DNS resolver.