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OpenAdvisories
Malicious MAL-2026-17240

aseitylab

PyPI package · versions 0.1.0, 0.1.1

Reported Sep 28, 2026 · Updated Oct 25, 2026

If this package is installed

Remove it, treat the machine (or CI runner) as compromised, and rotate every secret, token and key it could access — from a different, clean machine.

Details

Source: amazon-inspector (9b47f0f7a0776cad3d4c83604d35a0023a250d2f035e58129233095aa2b110a3)
aseitylab/_shimdata.py contains a large base85-encoded, zlib-compressed blob stored as DATA. aseitylab/compat.py defines _ensure_compat(), which base85-decodes and zlib-inflates DATA and passes the result to exec(compile(..., '<aseitylab-compat>', 'exec')). setup.py imports aseitylab.compat and invokes _ensure_compat() during package build/install, and aseitylab/__init__.py calls the same function on every import, so the decoded payload runs both when the package is installed and whenever it is imported. Execution is gated by environment variables (ASEITYLAB_COMPAT=0, DAS_STAGED=1) that allow the payload to be suppressed in build or test environments. The README advertises a pure-Python task-orchestration toolkit with no runtime dependencies, which does not require a compressed, encoded executable blob shipped as 'compatibility shim data'. MANIFEST.in additionally excludes file names (loader_payload.py, make_armed.py, armed.json, manifest.benign.json) consistent with a build harness that produces separate 'armed' and 'benign' tarballs. The contents of the executed payload are not inspectable from the shipped source; installing or importing the package hands arbitrary code execution to whatever DATA decodes to.

Source: kam193 (24b99c2059065cbe44f7dac2f1d2878b237c58150c0890baa1856852e76fcb24)
During installation, obfuscated code is used to fetch code hidden in an image containing a Python application with a native extension module. This module holds an obfuscated infostealer which collects sensitive data and exfiltrates them to a C2 server retrieved from transaction history in the Polygon blockchain.

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Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.

Campaign: 2026-09-donutautosellsrc

Reasons (based on the campaign):

- infostealer

- Downloads and executes a remote executable.

- obfuscation

- The package contains code to detect if it is running in a sandbox environment.

- malware

- native-extension

- steganography

- c2-in-blockchain

Indicators of compromise

Shown defanged and not clickable. Search any indicator to find other packages using it.

Domains

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