If this package is installed
Remove it, treat the machine (or CI runner) as compromised, and rotate every secret, token and key it could access — from a different, clean machine.
Details
Source: amazon-inspector (8f03abfe6149423144b6d3143a66cbca7925bb6eb736b1ece350d5a344684eb9)
@hrmony/pladddform-frontend@48.99.0 ships an index.js whose top-level code, executed on require/import, POSTs to the hardcoded attacker host https://hrnmn.dd.h4x.tv/save_instance_info_from_pkge_hrmony_pladddform-frontend and then invokes two harvesters. aws_get() queries the AWS EC2 Instance Metadata Service at 169.254.169.254 using IMDSv2 (PUT /latest/api/token) and sweeps /latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/ to collect instance identity, IAM role names, and temporary IAM security credentials. local_get() enumerates every entry of process.env and recursively reads /var/run/secrets/, capturing Kubernetes-mounted service-account tokens and secret files. Both payloads are POSTed to the same hardcoded hrnmn.dd.h4x.tv endpoint. The package has an empty description, no functional code beyond the stealer, an intentionally misspelled scope and name mimicking an internal 'harmony/platform-frontend', and declares a dependency on the similarly look-alike '@hrmony/kit-5', consistent with a dependency-confusion typosquat targeting an internal package name.
Source: ghsa-malware (37ed7f1bf9d1ce61730644e3ac7eaf7f1525da3d26b9f9ba1f171d2ff2b72ae6)
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.