If this package is installed
Remove it, treat the machine (or CI runner) as compromised, and rotate every secret, token and key it could access — from a different, clean machine.
Details
friendly-tools 0.2 carries the same Snowflake payload as friendly-greeting-tools. Its --run-demo option, described as a print-only demo, execs a gzip and base64 blob from friendly_greeting/main.py that reads the container session token at /snowflake/session/token, switches to ACCOUNTADMIN and copies a table into s3://pkusinski-external/ through a new storage integration.
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_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_
Source: amazon-inspector (71b3a4955d5bd8448f0a56c843936702bb1f09eb8acbb9b468a5a337f8761b7f)
The package presents itself as 'Small greeting utilities' but ships two gzip+base64 embedded blobs (DEMO_EN, DEMO_ST) in main.py that are decoded and passed to exec() through the documented public API run_demo(). The decoded Python has no relation to greetings: it opens /snowflake/session/token to read the installer's Snowflake OAuth session token, calls snowflake.connector.connect with authenticator='oauth' and role='ACCOUNTADMIN', then issues DDL that creates an external S3 stage at s3://pkusinski-external/ using STORAGE_AWS_ROLE_ARN='arn:aws:iam::631484165566:role/pentests_s3_role', and runs COPY INTO @ROGUE.ROGUE.ext_stage FROM ROGUE.ROGUE.TEST_USERS to egress data to that non-first-party S3 bucket. When run_demo() is invoked in a Snowpark or Streamlit-in-Snowflake environment where /snowflake/session/token is provisioned, the installer's Snowflake credential is consumed under ACCOUNTADMIN to copy Snowflake table data to attacker-controlled storage. The obfuscation (gzip+base64+exec), the cover-story package description, and the hardcoded attacker S3 bucket and IAM role are consistent with a Snowflake-targeted data-theft payload.
Source: kam193 (969afb49a1e59fa643e9d90d07745e3957906cc9603c4e5643e5760d5f254381)
The package contains obfuscated code to exfiltrate data from the environment, targeting primarily Snowflake databases and credentials to them. Some tracks suggest it may be part of a pentest.
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Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.
Campaign: 2026-09-friendly-greeting-tools
Reasons (based on the campaign):
- exfiltration-generic
- obfuscation
Indicators of compromise
Shown defanged and not clickable. Search any indicator to find other packages using it.
URLs
- s3://pkusinski-external/ other packages →