If this package is installed
Remove it, treat the machine (or CI runner) as compromised, and rotate every secret, token and key it could access — from a different, clean machine.
Details
Source: amazon-inspector (091649f7b927b27a5bd7a35b53784433050bf58e0dc11acc95316b650a13f60b)
SPO365-GRAPH presents itself as a SharePoint Online Graph client, but the shipped library module SPO365_GRAPH/SPO365_GRAPH.py consists entirely of stub methods returning placeholder values; all real logic lives in setup.py and executes at install time. On `pip install`, setup.py decodes a zlib+base64 blob (_SERVICE_CONFIG) into a configuration dict holding an AWS STS endpoint, a hardcoded RoleArn, an RSA public key, upload/webhook URLs, a proxy host, and an embedded Lambda source. It then reads ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_URL and ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_TOKEN from the environment, requests a GitHub Actions OIDC JWT with audience sts.amazonaws.com, and calls STS AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity against the attacker's hardcoded RoleArn to obtain temporary credentials under the attacker's trust policy. Using those credentials it submits a CloudFormation CreateStack request whose TemplateBody embeds an AWS::Lambda::Function with Code.ZipFile sourced from the obfuscated config (_cfg['vs']) and a hardcoded role/function name, polls DescribeStacks for Outputs, then base64-decodes the collected outputs, wraps them with hybrid RSA-OAEP + AES-256-CBC using the embedded public key, and uploads the ciphertext via PUT to _cfg['ru'] with a POST fallback to _cfg['fu'], optionally through a hardcoded HTTP proxy at _cfg['px']. Author metadata is a disposable proton.me address. The naming, stub library, and obfuscation of every operational parameter are a cover story for a CI/CD-targeted OIDC-to-AWS credential abuse and remote-code-execution dropper.
Source: kam193 (ea8dd7600717964f4ca8f8b1134f867f4bf69f1538243d5c7da752eefed99fe1)
During installation, the package deploys a rogue AWS Lambda function to collect credentials from Secret Manager as well as collect other data. Data are then exfiltrated. The malicious code was introduced in version 1.1.2.
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Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.
Campaign: 2026-10-spo365-graph
Reasons (based on the campaign):
- The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.
- exfiltration-cloud-tokens
- targetted-attack
- exfiltration-credentials
Indicators of compromise
Shown defanged and not clickable. Search any indicator to find other packages using it.
URLs
- hxxps://catdig-azdo-cfn-platform-bravo-prod-us-east-2[.]s3[.]amazonaws[.]com/cfn-artifacts/platform-bravo-api-health-check[.]json other packages →