If this package is installed
Remove it, treat the machine (or CI runner) as compromised, and rotate every secret, token and key it could access — from a different, clean machine.
Details
Source: amazon-inspector (320488b79c9000782e398425aa1a2fddba7f29a487913bbb2fc2019405c078f5)
The package is published as `rgx33-css-grid-utils` but exports a set of module keys matching Wix thunderbolt internal registries (`thunderboltRegistry`, `siteAssetsRegistry`, `editorRegistry`, `corvidRegistry`, `dataBindingRegistry`, `documentManagementRegistry`, and others) — a dependency-confusion lure targeting Wix's internal build/runtime namespace. On module load, an IIFE collects host identifiers (hostname, pid, Node version, platform) and runs `child_process.execSync('id')` and `child_process.execSync('uname -r')` to capture the current user and kernel version. These values are encoded as DNS subdomain labels and sent via `fetch` to the interactsh/OOB collector `davdpb8lhot13kgmnhp0863x9g83mpswq.oast.live`, and in parallel to `https://webhook.site/0492a36c-4d7b-408a-865c-226db25987ba` with a `where=wix-blog` query parameter identifying the campaign target. The package ships no CSS grid functionality consistent with its name; the reconnaissance beacon is the entire payload.