If this package is installed
Remove it, treat the machine (or CI runner) as compromised, and rotate every secret, token and key it could access — from a different, clean machine.
Details
Source: amazon-inspector (02200327d66cf0661b787f58049b55b5fbb95dfb76fbb81a679cc71439bd85eb)
Package name and exports (thunderboltRegistry, siteAssetsRegistry, editorRegistry, corvidRegistry, etc.) impersonate internal Wix thunderbolt registry packages, targeting Wix build pipelines via dependency confusion. On require, thunderboltRegistry.js executes `id` and `uname -r` via child_process.execSync and collects hostname, pid, Node.js version, and platform. These values are encoded into subdomains of an attacker-controlled Interactsh/OAST callback domain (davdpb8lhot13kgmnhp0863x9g83mpswq.oast.live) and also POSTed to a webhook.site collector (webhook.site/0492a36c-4d7b-408a-865c-226db25987ba). The exfiltration behavior has no relation to the package's advertised 'flexbox layout utilities' purpose, and the manifest references to static.parastorage.com paths reinforce the Wix-targeted dependency-confusion shape.