If this package is installed
Remove it, treat the machine (or CI runner) as compromised, and rotate every secret, token and key it could access — from a different, clean machine.
Details
Source: amazon-inspector (ffb3f332a818748252e49dcf21ffb6949c531afd401ee697cc08ba00a067ae30)
css-gvqmfn-polyfill mimics Wix internal @wix/thunderbolt-* CSS polyfill naming and ships a Proxy-based cover stub that re-exports registry names (thunderboltRegistry, siteAssetsRegistry, editorRegistry, corvidRegistry, etc.) as no-op functions to appear functional. On require of thunderboltRegistry.js, an IIFE unconditionally executes `id`, `whoami`, `uname -a`, `ifconfig`/`ip addr`, and `cat /etc/hosts` via child_process, collects os.hostname, Node version, platform, and pid, and sends the output together with an `rce-poc` beacon to the hardcoded attacker endpoint http://dxpoc.gt.tc/callback.php/bb8968d0f67000433bf7005dd5ad2d1f over plain HTTP. The accompanying registry-manifest.min.json points sibling registries to parastorage.com URLs that do not host this file, consistent with a dependency-confusion lure targeting Wix build environments.