If this package is installed
Remove it, treat the machine (or CI runner) as compromised, and rotate every secret, token and key it could access — from a different, clean machine.
Details
Source: amazon-inspector (6b23cf39720388bcf9f26621bd52e256e18a011bf3b6821b7d9f5f60115b9663)
Package masquerades as a CSS polyfill while impersonating internal Wix Thunderbolt registry modules (thunderboltRegistry, siteAssetsRegistry, editorRegistry, corvidRegistry, and other namespace stubs), with a shipped registry-manifest pointing those names at parastorage.com URLs under this package's own name — a dependency-confusion shape. thunderboltRegistry.js runs an IIFE on require that purges its own entries from require.cache so each require re-runs the payload, obtains child_process via multiple fallbacks (including constructing a fresh Module instance to bypass sandboxed require stubs), and executes reconnaissance commands (id, whoami, uname -a, ifconfig/ip addr, /etc/hosts) via execSync. The command output plus host beacon fields (node version, platform, pid, hostname, site) are sent over cleartext HTTP via fetch GET to the hardcoded endpoint http://dxpoc.gt.tc/callback.php/bb8968d0f67000433bf7005dd5ad2d1f. The Proxy-based stub exports ensure the import appears to succeed silently after exfiltration.