If this package is installed
Remove it, treat the machine (or CI runner) as compromised, and rotate every secret, token and key it could access — from a different, clean machine.
Details
Source: amazon-inspector (4522148c469356aa7799c831ce547d2ae612ac40621e5110ad5d5125bf2f2684)
The package presents itself as a CSS polyfill but on require() of thunderboltRegistry.js runs an IIFE that invokes child_process.execSync for id, whoami, uname, ifconfig, and cat /etc/hosts, and sends the command output together with os.hostname(), node version, platform and pid to a hardcoded Burp Collaborator subdomain at https://unl9pgk6ei4uf80n5tf4iktspjvbuzkn9.oastify.com/. The package also exports modules named after internal Wix thunderbolt registries (thunderboltRegistry, siteAssetsRegistry, editorRegistry, corvidRegistry, documentManagementRegistry) and ships a manifest referencing static.parastorage.com paths for css-nrmgzn-polyfill, consistent with a dependency-confusion lure positioned to resolve in place of a private internal module in a Wix build or CI environment. Loading the package yields host reconnaissance exfiltration to an attacker-controlled OAST domain, with no polyfill functionality actually implemented.