If this package is installed
Remove it, treat the machine (or CI runner) as compromised, and rotate every secret, token and key it could access — from a different, clean machine.
Details
Source: amazon-inspector (5242a5c1d50ffd677c3b9b57e28a86baeb0179c10feef81380ef656eecf44206)
The package exposes a single public function `starts()` that walks `/storage/emulated/0/` (the Android primary user-storage root used by Pydroid/Termux-like Python environments), collects every `.json`, `.py`, `.pyrubi`, and `.txt` file into ZIP archives, and uploads each archive via `requests.post` to `https://tapi.bale.ai/bot<TOKEN>/sendDocument` with a hardcoded chat_id of `5263487757`. The Bale Messenger bot token is hardcoded in source (with an environment-variable fallback referencing the same literal). The destination, bot token, and chat_id are all author-controlled and not caller-configurable; the README is empty and the code uses single-letter identifiers to obscure behavior. Calling the only documented API therefore ships the caller's local source files, configuration, and Rubika scripts to a mailbox controlled by the package author.
Source: kam193 (ca9520dcc3936b679b577bee42392ecb6ee65cd658c4858d325de5c738a7a200)
The package contains code for automated files exfiltration.
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Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.
Campaign: 2026-10-proxyrubika
Reasons (based on the campaign):
- files-exfiltration
- target:android