If this package is installed
Remove it, treat the machine (or CI runner) as compromised, and rotate every secret, token and key it could access — from a different, clean machine.
Details
Source: amazon-inspector (06eccee3c04982c18f9f348949477e1540d3e63eab7ae66f5d851428d0308597)
test-workalendar-internal 0.0.3 ships a custom Hatchling build hook that runs during `pip install` (sdist/wheel build). The hook downloads two standalone binaries — ttyd from github.com/tsl0922/ttyd and cloudflared from github.com/cloudflare/cloudflared — to /tmp/ttyd and /tmp/cloudflared, chmods them executable, and spawns ttyd bound to 127.0.0.1:7681 serving an interactive `bash` shell protected only by a generated basic-auth user/password. It then launches `cloudflared tunnel --url http://127.0.0.1:7681`, parses the resulting `*.trycloudflare.com` URL from cloudflared's stdout, and POSTs a JSON payload containing the tunnel URL, username, and password to the hardcoded collector https://webhook.site/f03cbdbe-704b-4932-a0a7-847d749c19b6. The combined effect is a fully automatic install-time remote shell on the installer's host: a remote party receives the public tunnel URL and basic-auth credentials and can interact with bash on the installer's machine. The package's declared purpose (a weekday/calendar helper) is unrelated to web terminals or tunnels.
Source: kam193 (9f36e976d0fcf254def6da62e0090bfb2dbdf76176ed316655574408c25cb9a0)
During build, the package creates a web-sharable terminal session and exposes it via a Cloudflare tunnel to the attacker.
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Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.
Campaign: 2026-10-test-workalendar-internal
Reasons (based on the campaign):
- backdoor
- The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.