If this package is installed
Remove it, treat the machine (or CI runner) as compromised, and rotate every secret, token and key it could access — from a different, clean machine.
Details
Source: amazon-inspector (0203fffc73ebe748d6defab0472b648408b29c959a9c6813f966df48cfafb21b)
setup.py registers a custom install command (cmdclass install hook) and also fires at module import that connects to the hardcoded bare-IP endpoint 137.131.233.62:8080 and bridges a /bin/bash -i subprocess over the socket, giving the operator interactive shell access on the installer's host. Before opening the shell, the code POSTs host identifiers (hostname, uid, JCX_ENVIRONMENT) over plaintext HTTP to http://137.131.233.62:443/shell-beacon. The install hook double-forks, calls setsid, redirects stdio to /dev/null, and enters an infinite reconnect loop with a 60-second sleep, persisting the backdoor beyond the pip install process. A /tmp/.jcx_channel.done guard file is used to coordinate the channel. Destination is a bare IP unrelated to any publisher domain.
Source: kam193 (bdf4549e34df1c1c7dfd704454011cf0a26ea5807948e917d7bc65f130182fc9)
In specific environments, package starts a reverse shell during installation.
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Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.
Campaign: 2026-10-journey-test-helloshell
Reasons (based on the campaign):
- The package contains code to create a reverse shell, allowing an attacker to execute any commands on the victim's machine.
- The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.
- targetted-attack
Indicators of compromise
Shown defanged and not clickable. Search any indicator to find other packages using it.
URLs
- hxxp://137[.]131[.]233[.]62:443/shell-beacon other packages →
IP addresses
- 137[.]131[.]233[.]62 other packages →