If this package is installed
Remove it, treat the machine (or CI runner) as compromised, and rotate every secret, token and key it could access — from a different, clean machine.
Details
Source: amazon-inspector (25577370189f57a5678b2f2c45e212abfc79a3675dc7d51581f633e78aba47a6)
package.json declares `preinstall: sh./prepare.js && exit 0`. prepare.js is shaped like JavaScript (ending with `console.log('hello world')`) but is executed by /bin/sh, which does not treat `/**... */` as a comment. Inside that block, sh evaluates two `$(...)` command substitutions: one issues a GET to the hardcoded collector https://webhook.site/9e8c8742-3102-4716-aa8b-e150e9e84fe7/stats_1, and the other downloads https://api.github.com/gists/da04f14c93acbe9a7aef827be0a2e91c, extracts a file via jq, writes it to disk as `x`, and runs it with `sh x`. On `npm install`, the installer host fetches and executes arbitrary, unpinned, attacker-controlled content from a mutable GitHub Gist, and the webhook.site beacon discloses the install (and curl-visible metadata such as public IP and user-agent) to the attacker. The JS-comment-wrapping of the shell payload is a deliberate cover story so prepare.js reads as a trivial hello-world when viewed as JavaScript.