If this package is installed
Remove it, treat the machine (or CI runner) as compromised, and rotate every secret, token and key it could access — from a different, clean machine.
Details
Source: amazon-inspector (8608133ab1a2f106c095f84116cd25fa141208dbf81ea6fe2331e38a88551a4b)
The package ships a binding.gyp whose `sources` field uses GYP command-expansion (`<!(env node index.js...)`) with no native source files, causing npm's implicit `node-gyp rebuild` to execute index.js at install time. index.js is a Caesar+10 (ROT) obfuscated eval blob that, once decoded, AES-128-GCM-decrypts a hardcoded hex ciphertext and the sibling `data.bin`, brotli-decompresses the result, writes it to a mkdtemp'd temporary file, and spawns it under Bun (`Bun.spawn([execPath,'run',tmp])` / `spawn(getBunPath(),['run',tmp])`). package.json declares `bun` as a runtime dependency, deliberately routing execution through an alternate runtime rather than Node. The executed payload is fully opaque and attacker-controlled. The combination of a no-source binding.gyp used solely as a lifecycle trigger, multi-layer obfuscation (ROT + AES-GCM + brotli), and alternate-runtime dispatch has no legitimate native-build justification.