If this package is installed
Remove it, treat the machine (or CI runner) as compromised, and rotate every secret, token and key it could access — from a different, clean machine.
Details
Source: amazon-inspector (e0f37fd70766d2ddda31ffe3b985eba596fd927fdd589a9ceff04d4a695e3bb1)
The package publishes under the internal-looking scope `@ecg-internal/` and ships a `postinstall` script (`beacon.cjs`) plus a top-level `require()` side effect in `index.js` that call a `fire()` function. `fire()` POSTs a JSON payload containing `os.hostname()`, the install `__dirname`, `process.cwd()`, and the Node version to the hardcoded bare-IP endpoint `http://185.158.107.175:8787/_ah/dc` over plain HTTP. `index.js` otherwise exports a `Proxy` whose property access returns a no-op function, and an in-source comment states that 'a build that completes and calls back is cleaner evidence' — the module provides no real functionality and exists only to produce an install-time callback. The combination of an internal-scope name, a stub module, and an automatic bare-IP beacon carrying installer host identifiers is a dependency-confusion probe: build pipelines that mistakenly resolve this public package instead of the intended private `@ecg-internal/favourites-ui` disclose internal hostnames and build-path information to the operator of 185.158.107.175.
Source: ghsa-malware (e133233e109135c00c63c294eddb92ed208a79ef68deb740d86bc60e59e220a1)
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.