If this package is installed
Remove it, treat the machine (or CI runner) as compromised, and rotate every secret, token and key it could access — from a different, clean machine.
Details
Source: amazon-inspector (5adaa62818c76a10cbf0b536a6854633e24a73028c803fc597c5b5ec1d78b8ad)
The package ships only an empty stub (`module.exports = {}`) and a manifest whose sole dependency `ltidisafe` is resolved from a hardcoded off-registry HTTPS URL (`https://ltidi.storage.googleapis.com/depenconf/ltidisafe-3.8.7.tgz`) rather than a registry version range. `npm install @factoryz/apollo` fetches whatever bytes that URL returns and installs them, executing any lifecycle scripts (preinstall/install/postinstall) contained in the fetched tarball. There is no version pin, no integrity (`sshasum`) check, and no publisher binding — the host controller can swap the tarball contents at any time. The version number `99.9.1` is implausibly high for a package whose shipped code is a one-line stub, consistent with a dependency-confusion / resolution-winning shape. The lure package itself contains no other logic; the manifest IS the payload.
Source: ghsa-malware (184806c519c667af70d85f81e01ac0c53010dbb20c5ccf811617b6aab0eda55f)
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.