@sxm-content-creators/tools-ds

@sxm-content-creators/tools-ds is a dependency-confusion package with no functional code (its description is "Authorized Test Package"). Its postinstall script runs `node ./index.cjs` on npm install, which POSTs the hostname, home directory, platform and CI provider (GitHub Actions, GitLab CI, Azure Pipelines or Jenkins) to `https://130.162.231.177:8443/`. It was published by the npm account notsemz, which published two more packages with the same beacon on 2026-10-29 and seven placeholder-only names.

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_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_

Source: amazon-inspector (8b05391eed5aeb5b2df6a00ac95ee84f19e08a975532b60137dce712d32d8863)
On `npm install`, the package's postinstall hook executes `node./index.cjs`, which reads `os.hostname()`, `os.homedir()`, `process.platform`, and CI-provider environment variables (`GITHUB_ACTIONS`, `GITLAB_CI`, `TF_BUILD`, `JENKINS_URL`) and POSTs them as JSON over HTTPS to the hardcoded bare-IP endpoint https://130.162.231.177:8443/. The destination is a bare IP with no association to any declared publisher or documented purpose, and there is no caller-configurable alternative. The collected fields fingerprint whether the installer is a developer workstation or a specific CI pipeline, consistent with reconnaissance to prioritize follow-on targeting. The scoped package name resembles a legitimate internal namespace, consistent with a dependency-confusion lure shape.

Source: ghsa-malware (3413962fd6b4924514c7e2ea2fcc30b6c751163a8a798ffa5d38c21b4da941e8)
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.