If this package is installed
Remove it, treat the machine (or CI runner) as compromised, and rotate every secret, token and key it could access — from a different, clean machine.
Details
Source: amazon-inspector (89260928fc4083b0e6164b6ea05203462456b98e3b181a44527f1a9afc1f6004)
setup.py performs an unconditional HTTP GET at install time to the hardcoded bare IP http://38.242.235.206/depconf/doctreelstm/setup-py, sending the installer's username (USER/USERNAME env), hostname (socket.gethostname()), and current working directory as query parameters. The destination is a cleartext bare-IP endpoint, not a first-party registry or vendor host, and the beacon fires on `pip install` with no documentation, no opt-out, and no caller configuration. The package ships no functional code and self-describes as a defensive placeholder squatting an internal project name, but that framing is author-controlled and does not change that installer identity + host + cwd leave the machine to an attacker-controlled destination on install.
Source: kam193 (9609b278449fb9d196f4929f422f22288aa202df7b8417d91053ab0180711bb8)
Installing the package or importing the module exfiltrates basic information about the host, and the package has no other purpose.
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Category: PROBABLY_PENTEST - Packages looking like typical pentest packages, but also anything that looks like testing, exploring pre-prepared kits, research & co, with clearly low-harm possibilities.
Campaign: GENERIC-standard-pypi-install-pentest
Reasons (based on the campaign):
- The package contains code to exfiltrate basic data from the system, like IP or username. It has a limited risk.
- The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.