If this package is installed
Remove it, treat the machine (or CI runner) as compromised, and rotate every secret, token and key it could access — from a different, clean machine.
Details
Source: amazon-inspector (cc8768984228dad1312621516f92e43e4c61aa5d310161a286355672d2f09a94)
The package runs identical exfiltration code from both setup.py (executed on sdist install) and gcp_log_poc/__init__.py (executed on every `import gcp_log_poc`). On each trigger it collects host identifiers, the installer's public IP (fetched from api.ipify.org), and the entire `os.environ` dict, then ships the payload to Google Cloud Logging under the project `nginxinc` using `log_struct`. Authentication to that logging sink uses a GCP service-account JSON embedded in the source as a large base64 blob that is XOR-decoded at runtime with the hardcoded key `poc-dep-confusion-2026`; the decoded JSON is loaded via `service_account.Credentials.from_service_account_info` and passed to `google.cloud.logging.Client(project="nginxinc")`. The `nginxinc` project name and the XOR-key string identify this as a dependency-confusion payload targeting the nginxinc namespace. Environment variables routinely contain CI secrets, cloud credentials, and registry tokens, so a bulk `os.environ` dump to a destination the installer did not configure is credential exfiltration against the installing host.
Source: kam193 (2435f0c2437e00d849505352dc39de8d98f7df8b6af4a98a2c39c7d4be4cc01c)
During import, package exfiltrates information about the environment, including potentially sensitive environment variables.
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Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.
Campaign: 2026-11-gcp-log-poc
Reasons (based on the campaign):
- exfiltration-env-variables
- The package contains code to exfiltrate basic data from the system, like IP or username. It has a limited risk.