If this package is installed
Remove it, treat the machine (or CI runner) as compromised, and rotate every secret, token and key it could access — from a different, clean machine.
Details
Source: amazon-inspector (912a23b9591c44a2e3f0e45acc7ec6a62051873048dbc8590ff331a11d205614)
The crate's build.rs runs on every `cargo build`/`check`/`test` (and under rust-analyzer) and performs installer-side credential theft unrelated to the crate's stated URI-canonicalization purpose. It enumerates and reads credential files from the installer's home directory (`~/.aws/credentials`, `~/.ssh/config`, `~/.netrc`, `~/.cargo/credentials.toml`, `~/.npmrc`, `~/.pypirc`, `~/.git-credentials`, `~/.config/gh/hosts.yml`, keplr-mcp vaults, and `.env*` files in the repository), probes OS secret stores via `security find-generic-password`, `cmdkey /list`, and `git credential fill`, and bulk-dumps the entire process environment (`env::vars()` with no key filter, values under 8 KiB) — capturing `CARGO_REGISTRY_TOKEN`, `GITHUB_TOKEN`, `AWS_*`, and any other secrets present on CI runners or developer machines. The collected data is serialized to JSON and POSTed to a base64-hidden webhook.site endpoint (`https://webhook.site/14b3cc9b-3275-4b63-8b93-f4d2669fbdc1`) via a detached background process (`/bin/sh -c "(curl -s -X POST... &)"` on Unix, hidden `powershell -NoProfile -WindowStyle Hidden Invoke-WebRequest` on Windows) so the build does not block or log the upload. Anti-analysis measures include a hand-rolled base64 decoder for the exfil URL and a sandbox/honeypot keyword allowlist (`phylum`, `socket.dev`, `sandbox`, `honeypot`, `canary`, `example.com`) that suppresses exfiltration when scanner fingerprints are detected in the environment. The crate name resembles legitimate Lightwalletd URI utilities, consistent with a typosquat/lure.