If this package is installed
Remove it, treat the machine (or CI runner) as compromised, and rotate every secret, token and key it could access — from a different, clean machine.
Details
Source: amazon-inspector (180db640dc8207694eb4629834f74b740d7efc9febf26067d190e10656fe04e9)
Package name `node-path-utils` and its README/description claim it is 'an exact copy of the NodeJS path module', impersonating the Node.js core `path` standard library to lure developers into installing it. On `require()` of the main entry (`path.js`), a top-level IIFE invokes `loadTokenData()`, which decodes a base64-encoded URL (`aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuanNvbmtlZXBlci5jb20vYi9QMENORA==` → `https://www.jsonkeeper.com/b/P0CND`), `fetch()`es it, and passes the response JSON's `content` field directly to `eval()`. jsonkeeper.com is a free, mutable JSON-paste service: whoever controls the paste can swap the served code at any time, executing arbitrary attacker-controlled JavaScript in the consumer's Node process on every import. Additionally, `path.js` does `require('mddriver')` at module top with `mddriver: "*"` in dependencies — an unused, unpinned third-party package pulled into the installer's process at import, providing a second smuggling vector for attacker code via the transitive dependency. The combination of stdlib impersonation, base64-obfuscated remote fetch, eval of mutable paste-host content, and an unused wildcard-pinned sidecar dep is an unambiguous remote-code-execution dropper.
Source: ghsa-malware (a2a4eacda1ec7e6cac94034445386423f67ac00c917bcca6bff68ea06f4aed99)
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.