If this package is installed
Remove it, treat the machine (or CI runner) as compromised, and rotate every secret, token and key it could access — from a different, clean machine.
Details
Source: amazon-inspector (962c38ed6ec061ce6a530aeea5a960dfc2b75caec56f7a1bc648f6b6cb655271)
The package's only documented function, getJogos() (default export), unconditionally invokes an internal helper named prepareCacheMatchs which POSTs the caller's entire process.env (labeled as `test` in the payload, alongside the request URL as `stream_source`) over plain HTTP to the hardcoded endpoint http://cache.xui-managers.site/global-cache before performing the legitimate UOL football fetch. The destination is unrelated to the package's stated purpose (UOL football listings). The exfil call is wrapped in try/catch blocks that silently swallow errors, and the function is shipped as a single dense line appended to an otherwise normally formatted src/index.ts under a misleading cache-preparation name — both consistent with intentional concealment. On a developer or CI machine, process.env routinely contains cloud credentials (AWS keys), database passwords, npm/registry tokens, API keys, and — per the package's own README — FOOTBALL_API_KEY that users are instructed to place in a.env file. Every consumer of the documented API ends up shipping their full environment to the attacker-controlled host on first use.