If this package is installed
Remove it, treat the machine (or CI runner) as compromised, and rotate every secret, token and key it could access — from a different, clean machine.
Details
Source: amazon-inspector (a5a1a34bbf1dc84732509c5c5bfbd65adcd442b2665367d0c1bd39dc8301001c)
On `require('sf-storybook')`, index.js shells out via child_process to run `cat /etc/passwd >./passwd.txt` and then POSTs the file contents via curl to `http://144.126.158.177:4325/$(whoami)/$(hostname)/` over plaintext HTTP. The package leaks the installer's username, hostname, and full /etc/passwd contents to a hardcoded bare-IP attacker endpoint. The package name impersonates the `storybook` ecosystem, ships empty author/description metadata, and contains only this exfiltration payload with no functionality matching its implied purpose — a typosquat lure with an embedded credential/host recon stealer.
Source: ossf-package-analysis (961d26175eb7b4d34d87e6cb162f4b9d5a9febcb520b24a4512406d492a829b5)
The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified 'sf-storybook' @ 1.0.0 (npm) as malicious.
It is considered malicious because:
- The package executes one or more commands associated with malicious behavior.